INTRODUCTION
Mutual funds have huge financial resources, more than a halftrillion dollars of assets in the aggregate.' Only three types of financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, and pension plans) have greater aggregate assets. Yet despite their size, mutual funds rarely participate in corporate governance. They are intermediaries, channeling funds from disparate individuals into investments. They gather and process information about industrial investments that the funds' owners cannot easily gather and process. [Vol. 139:1469
They do the paperwork that individuals begrudge. They provide diversification, which is what many investors want. Yet they are not intermediaries that invest in concentrated holdings and that enter the corporate boardroom to represent their shareholder beneficiaries, which is what some investors might want. Voices are heard complaining that institutional investors do not become actively involved in monitoring, or supporting, the managements of their portfolio companies. Yet mutual funds usually stay far from the scene of corporate governance; only rarely can they be found inside the corporate boardroom.
In the 1930s some mutual funds began to act as monitoring intermediaries. They underwrote securities, became active players in bankruptcy reorganizations, and participated in management. 2 The Revenue Act of 1936, followed up by the Investment Company Act of 1940, forced the funds to stop. Why?
Odder still is the timing of the cut-off of mutual funds from corporate governance.
In the early 1930s Berle and Means publicized their finding that with the atomization of shareholdings, power was shifting from shareholders to managers in the large public company.
3 Mutual funds could concentrate shareholders'
power. The manager of a mutual fund could have been a conduit of shareholder power. The mutual fund would have the potential power and motivation to check the activities of management. But within a few years, tax rules and the 1940 Act raised the cost of (or outright prohibited) close mutual fund involvement with their portfolio companies. The prohibitions and restrictions were not oversights, nor were their consequences unintended. Key players in the Administration and Congress wanted to prevent mutual fund (and other banker) control of industrial companies. Explanations for severance can be seen in (a) popular opinion mistrustful of large financial institutions, (b) public-spirited rules intended to foster stable mutual funds for the average investor, (c) the accidents of tax doctrine, and (d) a glimmer of an interest group story of some political actors favoring local managers over Wall Street.
Opinion polls show the popular mind has mistrusted large financial institutions with accumulated power and has always been wary of Wall Street controlling industrial America. Politicians responded to this mistrust by enacting rules restricting the power of private financial institutions. During the SEC's formative years, its chairman said:
[T]he banker [should and will be] restricted to ... underwriting or selling. Insofar as management [and] formulation of industrial policies ... the banker will be superseded. The financial power which he has exercised in the past over such processes will pass into other hands.
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A pattern can be seen in the history of American corporate finance. 5 Institutions that can influence industry are restrained from growing too big. If they do grow anyway, their portfolios are forcibly fragmented. If the fragmented institutions attempt to link themselves together to control industry, law prohibits those links. For banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual funds, the story is the same. Either separately or collectively, they have, perhaps wisely, been stymied from controlling or influencing industry after they have made their investments. What's more, there is a pattern of politics behind these prohibitions. In this article, I examine one of these financial institutions, the mutual fund.
I. THE 1940 ACT RESTRICTIONS
Mutual funds pool the investment funds of hundreds of investors, thereby enabling the investors both to diversify and to buy the investment expertise of the fund's managers. Even when the 1940 Act was passed, cognoscenti recognized that the mutual fund offered a third function, beyond diversification and expert management: "[the investor] may be able to join in the purchase of control of one or more other corporations."
6 Investment companies could [Vol. 139:1469 take large blocks of stock, making monitoring worthwhile. In theory they could have evolved into the missing monitoring link between fragmented investors and large operating firms.
A. Power of Control
Congress was suspicious of mutual funds with the power to control industrial companies. A 1934 Senate securities report identified two functions for mutual funds: investment and control of management. 7 The report asserted the control function was improper for mutual funds. The funds should only passively invest. Holding companies rather than mutual funds were organized for control. And this control was denigrated: the holding company structure was indicted with conflicts of interest that damaged outside shareholders. Holding companies were generally under attack. Public utilities were commonly organized in holding companies until the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 forced their end. That same act. directed the SEC to draft legislation dealing with control blocks in mutual funds. And hostility to holding companies can be seen in the 1930's judicial opinions such as Consolidated Rock and Deep Rock. 8 Only unscrupulous financiers mixed investment with control: "The investment company [has] bec[o]me the instrumentality of financiers and industrialist-; to facilitate acquisition of concentrated control of the wealth and industries of the country."
9 As a consequence, Congress must "prevent the diversion of these [investment] trusts from their normal channels of diversified investment to the abnormal avenues of control of industry." 10 Congress might have "to completely divorce investment trusts from investment banking." 1 1 The SEC was later directed to draft legislation.
The SEC declared in its proposed bill that "the national public interest... [is] adversely affected... when investment companies [have] great size... [and] have excessive influence on the national economy.
" 12 In 1935, 65 investment companies had controlling interests in 187 portfolio companies. 13 Little good could come out of investment company control over portfolio companies, the SEC believed.
14 Big blocks could leave the fund undiversified; due to the lack of diversification the investment company might have heavy losses. The investment company might pump money into the portfolio company to protect a large position, unwisely change the portfolio company's financial policy or capital structure, force dividends out from the portfolio company at too high a rate, or force a merger on terms disadvantageous to the outside shareholders of the controlled company. 15 The SEC conceded that mutual funds had the expertise, motivation and financial muscle to ameliorate the informational and organizational problems of scattered shareholders. "These investment companies can perform the function of sophisticated investors, disassociated from the management of their portfolio companies. They can appraise the activities of the management critically and expertly and in that manner not only serve their own interest but also the interest of the other public stockholders." 16 Nevertheless, the disadvantages of investment companies with the power to control outweighed the advantages. The SEC wanted mutual fund directors and employees off the boards of all portfolio companies; they wanted a Glass-Steagall-type severance. 17 They also wanted to bar any fund from exceeding $150 million in holding companies).
12 1940 Act Hearings, supra note 10, pt. 2, at 434. This statement of purpose also showed concern for efficient investment management and protection of investors. [Vol. 139:1469 assets. 18 Eventually the SEC had to compromise with the mutual fund industry, but they still achieved a great deal of severance.
B. Diversification
First, under the Investment Company Act of 1940, a mutual fund cannot advertise itself as "diversified" if it owns in the regulated part of its portfolio more than 10% of the voting stock of any company.
19 Three-quarters of the portfolio is subject to this fragmentation rule, even f that influential block of stock is only a small portion of the fund's entire portfolio. 2 See id. § 3(b)(1), (c)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(1), (c)(6); T. FRANKEL, supra note 20, at 378-80. 25 See WHARTON INVESTMENT COMPANY REPORT, supra note 13, at 403 (noting Ohio, California and a few others); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1301:6-3-09(G)(1)(h) (1977) (prohibiting management-type investment companies from selling shares in Ohio if any part of the portfolio has more than 10% of the voting stock of a company).
plates. State rules and the tax limitations discussed in the next section help explain why.
The 1940 Act requires that mutual funds calling themselves diversified have no more than 5% of the mutual fund's regulated assets in the securities of any one issuer. 24 As a diversification standard, this provision is crude. But in the context of the 1930s understanding of finance it seems superficially defensible. Mutual funds are often designed for unsophisticated investors who cannot assemble a diversified portfolio or evaluate the mutual fund's portfolio. 25 By requiring some standard of fragmentation if the fund chooses to call itself diversfied, the 1940 Act helps make sure investors get what they were promised.
But this crude standard only justifies the 5% restriction (the mutual fund may not invest more than 5% of its regulated assets in any single company). The 10% restriction (the mutual fund may not buy more than 10% of a portfolio company's voting stock) is unnecessary for true diversification. Obviously, an investment company could have a small portion of its assets in a single firm, but if the firm were medium-sized the investment company could have an influential block of stock. Thus, the not-so-hidden goal was to disable control, not to promote diversification.
To be sure, the rule has disclosure benefits. And even a modern definition of diversification would require some fragmentation. A modern notion of diversification would not use the 10% restriction, which prohibits purchase of more than 10% of any portfolio company's stock. But the result might be close to the same. Only mutual funds much larger than any that now exist would be able to diversify, and take greater 10%+ blocks of the largest American public companies.
And the 10% restriction might instead be justified as a liquidity rule. Open-ended mutual funds must be prepared to redeem their stock. Heavy redemption would require the fund to sell portfolio stock, and a portfolio full of 10%+ holdings might be illiquid, if only because of 16(b) restrictions. Although the 1940 Act definition prevents a large diversified fund from taking large chunks of portfolio companies' stock, the rule is only a nuisance, not a show-stopper: the fund could decline to call itself diversified and this part of 1940 Act wouldn't bite. But as shall be seen, the large block would trigger other 1940 Act nuisances; the 1940 Act, and other rules, make it difficult to network medium-sized blocks held by several different financial institutions, and tax rules that roughly track the diversification definition would still apply, and be more than a nuisance.
C. Networks and Affiliates
The 1940 Act exempts a quarter of the portfolio from the fragmentation rules. And, the fund could choose theoretically not to call itself diversified in order to avoid regulation under the fragmentation rules. (I say "theoretically" because, as the next section shows, tax penalty rules track the 1940 Act's diversification rules.)
But for that limited portion of the portfolio that may be concentrated, other restrictions apply. True, the 1940 Act does not explicitly prohibit a mutual fund or its employees from sitting on the board of a portfolio company, as the SEC sought. But if the mutual fund owned 5% of a portfolio company's stock and networked with a group of institutions owning 5% of the stock of the portfolio company, all would become 1940 Act affiliates. The 1940 Act prohibits the mutual fund lacking an SEC exemption from acting jointly with an affiliated financial institution to join a portfolio company's board of directors, or otherwise jointly assert influence.
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Less significantly, if the block of stock were big enough so that the network's representative sat on the portfolio company's board and sufficiently influenced decisions so that it had a "controlling influence" that was attributed to the mutual fund, then transactions between any other member of the network and the portfolio company would be prohibited without SEC exemption. Each mutual fund in a constellation of separate mutual funds with a common advisor might take 4.9% of the portfolio company's stock. The common advisor to the funds could then wield a large block of stock. But I understand that while some mutual fund complexes have multiple holdings in several different mutual funds, they usually avoid having the aggregate ownership of the complex reach 10%, perhaps because of fear of entering legal gray areas.
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The 1940 Act prohibits cross-ownership.
No investment company may buy any voting stock of a corporation if each would own more than 3% of the voting stock of the other." 0 A portfolio company unhappy with the prospect of a mutual fund exerting control could force the mutual fund out by preemptively buying 3% of the fund's stock. 1 In effect, mutual funds need the consent of portfolio firm management before the mutual fund can enter the boardroom.
Moreover, if the mutual fund wished to act jointly with an affiliate to exercise control, it would need prior SEC approval. We can imagine an incipient network of institutional investors: An investment bank, an insurance company, or a commercial bank might become the investment adviser to a mutual fund. The adviser might take the 4.9% of the stock that the mutual fund holds, and combine that with a similar-sized holding of the investment bank, affiliated mutual funds, the insurance company, the commercial bank's trust department, or the bank's holding company. That combined block might be large enough to be influential, getting a 2 The common block might be attributed to the advisor and lead to affiliate status with the portfolio company anyway. By violating the spirit of the 1940 Act's 10% rule, the advisor might fear regulatory hostility, even if there were no regulatory action. The group might be aggregated for purposes of Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, which requires a return of six month trading profits for 10%+ owners. representative into the boardroom. But this consortium would have to obtain SEC approval of its activities, control actions, and plan. If the joint participants only wanted to campaign to get a director elected, then it would be hard to see why the SEC would deny the request. The approval would be a cost, but not a show-stopper. But if a participant expected to do business with the portfolio company, by lending, for example, then one should expect-for good reason, perhaps-SEC hostility. In the absence of a blanket SEC authorization, the need for SEC approval is one more burden on institutions that seek influence in the boardroom. The 1940 Act rules discourage financial networks.
II. ORIGINS IN THE 1936 REVENUE ACT

A. Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code
If a mutual fund were to deploy most of its portfolio in large influential blocks, it would be taxed unfavorably on its entire portfolio, because the Tax Code allows only diversified mutual funds to pass income through, untaxed to the conduit mutual fund. The 1936 Revenue Act's notion of diversification, like the 1940 Act's notion, is not that found in. modern textbooks on corporate finance; mutual funds have to have their investments in companies constituting no more than 5% of the portfolio and constituting no more than 10% of the portfolio company's outstanding stock. 33 Later, in 1942, the Tax Code was amended to allow half of the portfolio to be more concentrated; for that other half, no more than 25% of the fund's assets can go into a single company's stock. 4 Witnesses at the 1940 Act hearings suggested that the principal basis for the distinction between diversified and nondiversified companies was not tax policy, but regulatory policy. The distinction was to establish "good" mutual funds-those that did not exert 4) (1988) ). Venture capital firms, which could monitor small firms, not the large firms that are our subject, are partially exempt from the nocontrol provision. See I.R.C. § 851(e) (1988).
control-which would be favorably taxed, and all other mutual funds, which would be unfavorably taxed. If a mutual fund's income were taxed at the ordinary corporate tax rate, that is, if the fund could not get pass-through status, the fund would be decimated by a triple taxation of income. Income received as dividends would be taxed twice: once when earned by the portfolio company, and then again when received by the mutual fund. The mutual fund could exclude most of the dividends received, netting out to an effective tax rate of 10% on dividends. Capital gains would be taxed at 34%. The income would then be taxed again at ordinary rates when paid to shareholders of a nondiversified fund. 6 The tax on intercorporate dividends has a history parallel to mutual fund regulation and taxation. Until 1935, intercorporate dividends were not taxed. Then the New Deal Congress taxed dividends to discourage complex corporate structures.
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The tax result would also deter most ordinary corporations from taking large long-term ownership blocks. A corporation might accept the unfavorable tax status in the short-run, as a prelude to a takeover and restructuring. But the corporation asserting control over the long-term would have to be confident that it had unusually acute monitoring skills. After all, if the monitor received half of its income in capital gains and half in dividends, then it would have to pay approximately 20% of its income in taxes. A great deal of effective monitoring would be needed to make up for that initial Here is the calculation, based on today's rates for a non-subchapter M corporation. The fund's tax rate is 34%. Seventy percent of its dividends received from portfolio companies are excludable. These dividends face an effective tax rate of 10.2% (.3 x .34 = .102). If the fund owned more than 20% of the stock of some portfolio companies, the dividends from those companies would have an exclusion rate of 80%. These dividends would face an effective tax rate of 6.8% (.2 x .34 = .068). Capital gains would now be taxed at a rate of 34%. Since capital gains can be deferred by postponing the sales, the effective rate is less than 34%. [Vol. 139:1469 penalty. Nor could the company organize itself as a public partnership, which would be able to pass its income through to owners without itself paying tax. To get such pass-through tax status, a publicly-traded partnership must comply with subchapter M's portfolio restrictions.
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So, if a mutual fund wished to sell services as an intermediary/ monitor, by dividing its portfolio into three or four stocks, it could not get the advantage of subchapter M. And no mutual fund could ever threaten a portfolio company that it would devote more than a quarter of its assets to obtaining a majority of the portfolio company's stock in order to oust management. That threat, and the influence it would yield, is always prohibited for a subchapter M mutual fund. The costs of operating a control-fund are cumulative. First come the tax costs: dividends would be taxed at rates between 6.8% and 10.2%; capital gains would be taxed at the ordinary rate. Then come the other costs of taking large blocks: section 16(b) of the 1934 Act would force disgorgement of all short-swing trading profits made when the fund owned 10%+ of a portfolio company, regardless of whether the trading was done on inside information. 40 The costs of the fund networking with other financial institutions would not be trivial. (Section 13(d) requires the network to register with the SEC. The fund cannot affiliate with a commercial bank or its trust department. 41 ) And foregoing the tax advantages of subchapter M would not relieve the fund of the costs of the 1940 Act: the fund would still have to register as an investment company under the 1940 Act and comply with the Act's terms. These laws do not prohibit all large blocks in mutual funds. But they do constrain the supply of blocks, and raise the cost of networking with others to send a representative into the boardrooms of the largest public companies. 
Investment Trusts: Carrying on a Business?
A persistent difficulty in corporate taxation is determining which entities are taxable as "corporations." The term, said the Revenue Act of 1926, includes "associations, joint-stock companies and insurance companies." 42 Trusts and mutual funds were threatened as associations, which would be taxable as corporations, instead of as pass-through, untaxed entities.
Case law and regulation made several distinctions, one of which is quite relevant for our purposes. A trust would not be separately taxed as a corporation if it was not carrying on a business (and met several other requirements). Thus, the problem was that if the trust carried on a business-say by controlling an operating company and affecting its policies-then it was carrying on a business of managing companies. Trusts took the position that when only assembling a passive portfolio of [Vol. 139:1469 diversified stocks and doing no more, the trust never became an association under the Tax Code.
Morrissey v. Commissioner 46
The IRS then took the doctrinally unsurprising position that the business of providing diversified investments was itself a business. 47 From this perspective, all trusts and mutual funds should be taxable at corporate rates. Eventually, in 1935, the Supreme Court agreed. 48 Investment trusts and mutual funds were organized to make a profit. Therefore they were associations under the Tax Code. Consequently, they would be taxed as corporations.
The cumulative effect of these decisions was to insulate only the unit investment trust from corporate taxation. 49 The unit investment trust puts together a portfolio of securities, sells subdivided interests in the portfolio, collects the earnings, and returns them to the beneficiaries. It does not ordinarily buy or sell securities for the trust. These passivity doctrines persist in today's subchapter M. Fragmentation induces passivity, but fragmentation is not the only passivity-inducing element of subchapter M. Pass-through status under subchapter M is available only to companies that derive 90% of their income from investment in stocks, bonds and other securities. 50 On the face of the statute, there is a serious question whether a company that intended to make a significant portion of its income from management, as opposed to passive investment, would be entitled to subchapter M pass-through at all.
Liberalization in the 1936 Code
Against this background, the 1936 Tax Code should be seen as a "liberalizing" tax law for the mutual fund industry. The 1936 Tax Act exempted from corporate taxation those mutual funds which had fragmented portfolios. Yes, for tax purposes such funds were 46 296 U.S. 344 (1935 carrying on a business; but it wasn't a "real" business. It was the business of picking stocks and bonds, not of sitting in boardrooms and influencing operating decisions. As the president of a leading mutual fund then said: "[The Tax Code] now recognize[s us] as being, for purposes of taxation, not a productive agency which should shoulder a heavier tax burden, but merely a managing agency to collect dividends and gains for distribution to its shareholders.
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Tax relief for mutual funds had a fairness-based justification. The wealthy could get the benefits of professional management by hiring their own trustee to manage their portfolio. The middle-class could only get this professional help through a mutual fund. But after Morrissey made mutual funds taxable in 1935, and intercorporate dividends became taxable under the 1935 Tax Act, getting that professional help was inordinately expensive. 5 2 Tax doctrine was reconciled with the goal of giving the middle-class collective access to professional investment management by returning to the view that picking a fragmented portfolio was not really a business after all.
The debate behind the 1936 Code shows the proponents of the final measure saying that "another safeguard that the amendment contains ... is to prevent an investment trust or investment corporation being set up to obtain control of some corporation and to manipulate its affairs." 53 The safeguard could be against the "evil" of Wall Street control of industry or the deterioration of tax doctrine in not allowing the investment trust to carry on a true business. Later testimony in the committee suggests that the evil of Wall Street control of large pots of money that could influence industry was at least part of the evil to ward off.M I suspect that similar sentiments are powerful today. A standard move in public choice analysis is to find an interest group that has "bought" the legislation at the expense of a diffuse and disorganized citizenry. In the financial regulation of banks and takeovers, legal commentators have seen strong elements of this interest group approach. But I believe this approach is less useful in understanding the 1940 Act. Mutual funds just were not financially important enough in the 1930s to evoke much interest group intervention.
Rather, politicians were operating at the symbolic level. They were creating a mutual fund industry. Through regulation and taxation, politicians created a framework for mutual funds based on their concept of what a legitimate mutual fund ought to be. Thereafter, mutual funds had to grow up within that framework.
A. Anti-Wall Street Sentiment
The Pecora Hearings and the Populists:
Father Coughlin and Huey Long
The Pecora hearings reflected and helped form a public opinion that mistrusted banking and securities practices on Wall Street. Wall Street bankers were defensive. The second J.P. Anti-banker leaders, such as Huey Long and Father Coughlin, emerged first on the periphery of national politics. But historians say that as their prominence grew they influenced developments in the 1930s due to Roosevelt's desire to coopt them and elements of their program. What explains the sudden rise to national prominence of Huey Long and Father Coughlin? In a recent history, Alan Brinkley concludes that while the two men had their repulsive, demagogic side, they also tapped deep-seated sensible sentiments of popular protest against distant financial institutions:
The most troubling feature of modern industrial society, Long and Coughlin maintained, was the steady erosion of the individual's ability to control his own destiny. Large, faceless institutions; wealthy, insulated men; vast networks of national and international influence: all were exercising power and controlling wealth that more properly belongs in the hands of ordinary citizens. These same forces had created the economic crisis of the 1930s and threatened, if left unchecked, to perpetuate it.... Power, they argued, should not reside in distant obscure places; the individual should not have to live in a world in which he could not govern or even know the forces determining his destiny. Instead, the nation should aspire to a set of political and economic arrangements in which authority rested securely in the community, where it could be observed and, in some measure, controlled by 9 Id. at 6 (emphasis added); see also Bankers in general and Wall Street bankers in particular caused the Depression; they had to be punished. Certainly bankers were too powerful. The two extolled the virtues of small business and small banks:
Essential to the survival of the community, therefore, was an economy of small-scale, local enterprise. How important such an economy was to Long and Coughlin was apparent in the frequency with which both men lamented its disappearance. The two found that small enterprise had been extinguished by concentrated wealth and power. One by one, they complained, the autonomous local institutions that sustained a meaningful community life were vanishing in the face of distant, impersonal forces. 
B. Public Interest Perspectives
Protecting Unsophisticated Investors
Anti-Wall Street pressures were not the only reason for mutual fund regulation; populist pressure cannot explain everything. Surely some mutual funds wanted to regularize their industry, making it attractive to the average saver by reducing the risks of banker wheeling and dealing. And Congress wanted to protect investors, fearing that unsophisticated investors would invest in mutual funds expecting diversification but be unable to evaluate the portfolio. The SEC testified that a mutual fund's only positive function was to provide diversification; any extension risked thievery.
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Keeping mutual fund managers out of controlling positions kept them free of conflicts of interest. The fund's investment adviser, an investment bank, would use the control exerted by the mutual fund to obtain securities underwriting business from the controlled portfolio company. 74 Or the investment advisor of the fund with control would unload unwholesome securities of that controlled company onto a gullible public. amounted to 1% or 30% of fund assets. 76 (Undoubtedly, one should not naively expect public-spirited behavior from rapacious bankers. The difficulty in the legislative history is that it does not equally mistrust the rapacity of corporate managers and fails to consider whether the greed of each could be used to neutralize each other.)
Senators also wanted to protect individual investors in mutual funds from the machinations of insider-manipulators. Denying financiers power to control industry was thought to reduce their ability to manipulate the controlled business. Financiers would control companies to issue unneeded, overpriced securities that would be dumped into controlled mutual funds, solely to generate fees for the financiers.
The mutual fund industry didn't strongly oppose all of the restrictions, in fact it preferred some elements. It wanted to sell its product and needed a code of conduct to certify the industry to the public. 77 To make money off of the unsophisticated, the mutual fund industry didn't need complex relations with portfolio companies; authority to use a heavy load was enough. Although resale price maintenance has been illegal in antitrust (but attacked as not necessarily good policy), the mutual fund industry had federallymandated noncompetition among dealers: the advisor sets the load, dealers cannot cut it. Price competition among mutual fund dealers is a criminal offense. 78 These elements can be seen as part of the political payoff to the mutual fund industry for the operating restrictions. And, as I note below, one type of mutual fund-the Massachusetts trust-preferred that Congress require all mutual funds to use a structure that the Massachusetts trust had already adopted. 76 See id. at 333-37 (comments of Senator Wagner and others). If Roosevelt was right, then political stability in the United Statessurely a worthwhile objective-was dependent, at least in the 1930s, on fragmenting finance. One way to fragment finance was to eliminate investment banker control of industry through mutual funds. But the financial reality of the 1930s suggests that destruction of mutual fund power to control was symbolic. Mutual funds indeed had taken some first steps in influencing industry, and, yes, they had the potential to be big players in finance and industry. But the aggregate assets that mutual funds controlled in the 1930s were just too small to be a big threat to political stability. In 1940, there were only 68 mutual funds, with total assets of only $450 million. So, it was not the immediate prospect of "unwarranted economic power," to use Roosevelt's words, but the symbolic potential, or, at best, the prospect that in alliance with other financial institutions, the mutual fund would play a serious role.
A prominent historical view is that, at crucial tim'es in American history, business interests became so powerful that a political counterweight arises. Before big business could crush others in the economic system, politicians saved the nation from injustice by checking (but not destroying) those business interests. According to this view, Andrew Jackson rose to check the crushing weight of Eastern finance on the average American. 8 historical view politicians are populists or tools of interest groups; in the other view politicians are heroic figures saving America from powerful business interests. These two views can be reconciled for our purposes. In the social justice vision, righthearted politicians save farmers and workers from the onslaught of capital. In the other vision, cynical politicians check capital so that favored groups (labor and managers) will be benefitted. The factual story for each historical vision is roughly similar. The spin, the connotation, the sense of rightness, is what is variant. 
Fighting Cartels
One reason to block control was to block cartelization. A mutual fund could be the means by which an investment banker controlled several companies in a single industry, as Morgan did. That control could be used to promote and police a cartel. Louis Brandeis is often cited as setting the tone and providing a plan for action.
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"The dominant element in our financial oligarchy is the investment banker.
Associated banks, trust companies and life insurance companies are his tools." 89 Bankers should be middlemen, raising capital only; there should be no interlocking of financial institutions into powerful economic centers.
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Woodrow Wilson also believed small groups of people in large corporations made autocratic decisions, concentrating in their own hands the "resources, the choices, the opportunities, in brief, the power of thousands." 9 1 Trusts were growing in size and power, and had to be stopped. careful to stymie mutual fund control of industry. No more than 25% of the mutual fund's portfolio could go into the stock of a single company. Nor could 25% go into the stock of two or more controlled companies "engaged in the same or similar trades or businesses or related trades or businesses." 94 The fund could put all of its assets into a single industry and get pass-through tax status and diversified status under the 1940 Act. But it could not control companies in that single industry. And owning 20% of the stock of a portfolio company gave the mutual fund control for purposes of the fragmentation requirement. The legislative history shows an example:
Investment company W... has its assets invested as follows: 20 percent in cash and Government securities, 5 percent in corporation A, 10 percent in corporation B, 25 percent in corporation C, and the other 40 percent in the securities of miscellaneous corporations, not exceeding 5 percent in any one issuer. Investment company W owns more than 20 percent of the voting power of corporations B and C. Corporation B manufactures radios and corporation C acts as its distributor and also distributes radios for other companies. Investment company W fails to meet the requirements of section 361(b)(4) since it has 35 percent of its assets invested in the securities of two issuers which it controls and which are engaged in related trades or businesses.
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If monitoring by mutual funds were functionally possible, this tax rule would be a barrier. Monitoring requires specialized staff, with industry knowledge. If the fund cannot concentrate its influential blocks in a single industry, or its vertically related parts, assembling a staff would be difficult or impossible. The post-1942 structure of subchapter M produces odd results. If the mutual fund keeps its entire portfolio fragmented, it can put its entire portfolio into a single industry. A few mutual funds do this-Fidelity's "Select" funds come to mind. Shareholders of these funds get little diversification. Because the fund managers are exclusively investing in a single industry, they might acquire enough expertise so that they can second-guess some portfolio company managers every now and then. Functionally, the fund might get enough expertise to feel comfortable with a few influential positions. After all, the shareholders are not getting much diversifica- [Vol. 139:1469 tion from the fund anyway: its portfolio is all in one industry. But the fund managers cannot put more than 25% of its assets into control blocks in a single industry; the fund cannot concentrate investments in a single industry without tax penalty.
C. Interest Groups
The Managers: But Dimly
From a modern perspective, one would have expected managers to have been ardent supporters of the fragmentation of mutual funds. Corporate managers want independence from their shareholders. Certainly one can readily find managerial support for antitakeover legislation, 96 and managers benefitted from financial fragmentation. But the evidence does not show direct, powerful lobbying, or even testifying by managers in 1936 or 1940. Perhaps managers did not exert their influence because in the 1930s mutual funds were small players in the financial world, and the political action then was mostly symbolic.
But that does not mean we should dismiss the managerial public choice story completely. At least some politicians who promoted the 1940 Act appealed to managerial freedom from Wall Street control, and there is evidence that the 1936 and 1940 Act fragmentation provisions had survival strength because they did not threaten managers.
William 0. Douglas, as commissioner and chairman of the SEC in the 1930s, had a pivotal role in the regulation of financial institutions. Undoubtedly, he reflected the concepts and prejudices of many during that crucial. time. While he was a commissioner, the SEC proposed the Investment Company Act and formulated rules limiting joint action. Douglas's statements show two relevant principles: a displeasure with Wall Street, which roughly corresponds to our populist principle, and a displeasure with bankers controlling managers, which roughly corresponds to our managerial interest group story. Douglas surely wanted to destroy Wall Street control of Main Street, as he said in a 1937 speech, which I quoted in the introduction and repeat here: [T]he banker will ... [be] ... restricted to ... underwriting or selling. Insofar as management [and] formulation of industrial policies ... it is my belief that the banker will be superseded. The financial power which he has exercised in the past over such processes will pass into other hands.
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"Remote control by an inside few of these fundamental economic and human matters is fatal. There can be in our form of corporate and industrial organization no royalism which can long dictate or control these basic matters," 9 8 he said. The power of Wall Street must be held at bay: "finance moves into the zone of exploitation whenever it becomes the master rather than the faithful and loyal servant of investors and business. To make finance such a servant rather than a master becomes a central plank in any platform for reform." corporate managers might have killed the rule. Even at the height of the New Deal, if a rule threatened managers it would have been unstable, subsequently challenged, and then probably reversed.
Consider the experience of two tax rules passed in 1936. One threatened managers, the other-mutual fund fragmentation-did not. The threatening provisions were attacked, watered down, and then repealed. The non-threatening, manager-friendly portfolio fragmentation rules have persisted nearly intact for fifty years; they've been watered down only once, in 1942, and then only slightly.
The 1936 Revenue Act taxed undistributed corporate profits. If a corporation retained 60% or more of its net income, the retained earnings were taxed at a rate of 27%.101 The tax, not surprisingly, pushed managers to distribute most of their profits. Companies that needed funds were dependent on capital markets to replenish the monies dividended out. When they returned to the capital markets, bankers and securities buyers would scrutinize the managers' results, and penalize them (in the form of higher capital costs) if the results were poor.
Companies with diminished prospects for future profit would face difficulty in raising new funds. One suspects that during the Depression many companies met the economic requisites for contraction; once they dividended out their funds, they would be forced to contract. Managers unhappily found themselves controlling a smaller enterprise.
Either way managers were unhappy with a serious tax on retained earnings. If they needed new funds for expansion, they disliked the increased scrutiny of bankers and other investors. If their company were one that should have been contracting, managers disliked the quickened pace of contraction induced by a retained earnings tax, which forced fast and heavy dividends when the capital markets would not provide new funds. And one might add to Berle and Means's list, the extent to which an undistributed profits tax forces distribution, subjecting managers to the capital markets. Tugwell, the Administration's principal proponent of an accumulated earnings tax, and at times an academic and administrative colleague of Berle, offered managerial discipline as a rationale for the undistributed profits tax. His principal goal was to reduce excessive corporate savings, which he thought would increase consumer spending. But he and others in the Administration thought the tax "would give the stockholders more influence in the formulation of corporation dividend and corporation saving policies." OF THE NEW DEAL 211-12 (1956) (discussing Tugwell's plan for an undistributed profits tax which would lead to higher output and greater productivity from private business); A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 69, at 506-07 (describing Tugwell's plan as an attempt "to force corporate profits into purchasing power as wages or dividends").
[Vol. 139:1469 Managers and their political allies vehemently objected to this undistributed profits tax. 106 "Few taxes have evoked such a storm of passionate and partisan controversy as that on the undistributed profits tax. Spokesmen for corporations objected strenuously on the ground that the tax made for economic instability, [and] interfered with corporate policies .... "107 In 1938, the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Mining Congress, and the New York Board of Trade all opposed the taxi°8 They succeeded: first they got Congress to cut the rate. 10 9 The next year they got Congress to repeal the tax. 110 Managers' decisions on how much of the profits to pay out to shareholders would no longer be affected by the corporate tax. Managers could retain earnings, and were more free from the discipline of the capital markets.
The survivorship argument should now be clear. Proposals can originate in the Treasury Department without any interest group pressure. The Treasury may well make its proposals based solely on what Treasury officials think would be best for the country, based on their own policy predilections. But for a proposal to survive it must not gore the ox of a powerful interest group. The tax on undistributed profits threatened managers; within a few years they killed it. In contrast, the Treasury's simultaneous proposal to tax mutual funds with only fragmented portfolios did not incur the ire of managers; it survived.
To be sure, this story does not make managers the moving force behind the mutual fund tax bill, as they often are in modern antitakeover legislation. But it suggests that managers could well have killed mutual fund fragmentation if they felt threatened. They did nothing about mutual fund fragmentation either because they liked it, or because they were indifferent to it. Since mutual funds were small players in the 1930s, managers may have cared little about the structure of mutual fund portfolios back then.
Massachusetts Trusts
Massachusetts trusts typically had a diversified structure.
1
The trustees avoided controlling industry. When the 1936 Tax Act was considered and passed, one of the key players was Senator Walsh, chair of the Senate Finance Committee, from Massachusetts. He praised the Massachusetts trusts' structure and advocated mandating that all mutual funds have their structure. The 1936 Tax Code portfolio requirements essentially did that. Massachusetts trusts lobbied for the 1936 legislation with portfolio requirements roughly mimicking their own portfolio policies.
112 Massachusetts trusts could comply without a change in operation; others would have to bend. I believe a large number of mutual funds still operate out of Massachusetts.
IV. POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
I am seeking a political story to partly explain the fragmented ownership of the large public corporation in the United States. Politics produced financial fragmentation and financial fragmentation partly produced the large public corporation. The critical political elements are Federalism, interest groups and popular ideology, leavened by the public interest. Populism tended to weaken financial institutions. While populism could not itself weaken all of them, when there were plausible public-regarding benefits to fragmentation, or when an important interest group favored fragmentation, the result has usually been to fragment finance. Elsewhere I've claimed that these elements induced fragmentation of American finance, fostering the fragmented ownership of the public company l1 3 Here I claim that popular ideology and some public-interest views, leavened by some lukewarm interest group action, fragmented mutual funds. But perhaps there is an overriding economic story, conceivably an efficiency one, to explain the political story. [Vol. 139:1469 and Japan had much more powerful financial institutions that can heavily influence and indeed sometimes control industry? Several hypotheses are possible. The accidents of history may have led different systems to evolve in different countries. Perhaps the Japanese and German systems are inefficient, or just different but no better and no worse. Perhaps they lag an advanced American financial system, although -we must wonder why they have caught up or surpassed us in industry but lag in finance. Or perhaps countries with a feudal past and a recent acquisition of democracy more willingly tolerate the hierarchical implications of industry influence and control by financial institutions. To the extent this is so, then we should now expect to see political pressure in Germany and Japan to reduce the power of their financial institutions.
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But there is another possibility, a "meta" economic explanation for the political result: perhaps American and Japanese political and financial institutions responded to the underlying economics in each nation. Could the relative scarcity of managerial talent and capital explain the varying institutional arrangements?
Capital and resources have been relatively abundant in America, while skilled labor, perhaps including skilled managers, have been relatively scarce. Post-World War II Japan lacked capital and resources, but had a relative abundance of skilled and disciplined managers and workers. Did the relatively scarce resource in the United States-managerial talent-lead to contracts that favored managers at the expense of the abundant resource-capital? Those favorable contracts could include managerial autonomy from capital. These contracts were written, this story would go, but written in the political environment. In Japan and Germany, with capital scarce, the arrangements would favor capital.
This economic "meta".-story could help explain why contracts favoring managers would arise in the United States more than in Germany or Japan. But it wouldn't explain why these contracts would be written by Congress, instead of privately by each company and its managers. Here is one possibility: political pressure always arises to fragment finance, but politicians in an environment where capital is relatively more scarce resist this legislation. Why? Some politicians are reluctant because of the public interest; those managers who want autonomy may not seek the legislation vociferously, since with capital scarce other forms of private financial control will emerge anyway; institutions with capital resist the restrictions more strongly than they otherwise would. When capital is plentiful, the forces of fragmenting don't face these impediments.
What prediction would we make if capital became relatively more scarce in America and less scarce in Germany and Japan, a reversal occurring during the last decade? We should expect pressure, both financial and politica4 in Germany and Japan to change the relationships between capital and managers. Japanese and German managers would become more free from capital; and American financial institutions would develop more muscle. The first seems to be happening; the second possibility is generating talk.
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V. SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS My main purpose here has been to understand how politics and the 1930s conception of the proper role of mutual funds led to regulation and taxation that prohibited mutual funds from becoming important players in corporate governance. But this story has potential prescriptive implications. The SEC is now reviewing whether it should seek amendment to the 1940 Act. 116 The SEC they couldn't have been debilitatingly so) or efficient only in the context of German and Japanese history, culture, and ability to systematically produce good regulation and good regulators.
In Germany investment companies play an important role in corporate governance. Banks aggregate the vote of stock they own directly, stock owned by investment companies that the bank controls, and stock owned. by individuals but deposited with the bank as custodian. 11 8 They aggregate these votes-frequently amounting to 40% of the vote in many companies-to elect directors of portfolio companies, directors not beholden to the portfolio companies' managers. This activity would be barred in the United States by the Glass-Steagall Act, and would face serious, probably prohibitive obstacles under the 1940 Act because of the likelihood of conflicts of interest. How and whether this conflict is avoided in Germany is unclear.
A common misconception about German and Japanese banks is that their influence in industry comes only from control of credit. In Germany control over credit is a secondary factor; in Japan control over credit (which is weakening as a securities market for debt arises) may have been primary; but banks there control large blocks of stock as well. This misconception is understandable. Americans are so inured to banks being separated from commerce that credit intuitively seems to be the means of bank influence. But German banks enter the boardroom not through the usual advantage of a bank-control over credit-but through control of the proxy machinery.
Even if we thought that greater involvement of financial institutions would be salutary, we should be cautious. Financial institutions would not generally be better informed than incumbent managers who have spent a lifetime in their businesses; financiers could not-systematically manage companies any better. At best, financiers will be less biased toward growth, their representatives on corporate boards would be more likely to be independent of managers and would have the incentive to make the board a good one. At worst, they will be affected by their own conflicts of interest-seeking deal-making for fees-and never contribute to the functioning of the enterprise.
In the governance of small firms financiers play important roles, despite that the entrepreneur is better informed about the business. The financier there-called then a venture capitalist-appears to be functional. Such financiers know enough to avoid managing the enterprise, to only'ask questions and put operating managers on a budget. Yet financiers disappear from the boardroom when the enterprise goes public. Perhaps financiers usually disappear from the boardroom because their involvement would be dysfunctional. But although they cannot always be dysfunctional, it is nearly always so that their involvement is-legally restricted, as is the involvement of a mutual fund or its investment advisor.
If we were sure that financial institutions could improve operating companies, then we should examine the following question: should the fragmentation rules in the 1940 Act and the Tax Code be dropped? The diversification rule in the 1940 Act could be solely a disclosure matter, which could tie into modern notions of diversification; a fund that owned more than 10% of the portfolio company's stock could still be diversified. The large block limits and industry limits in subchapter M could be dropped. In the modern securities market, the central protection to buyers of the fund is adequate disclosure about the structure of the fund's portfolio.
The basic concept of diversification in the two acts is wellmeaning but antiquated. The laws' notion of diversification-no more than 5% of a single issuer-offers little in the way of investor ,protection. As I've shown, a mutual fund could put all of its monies into a single industry, making the fund ridiculously undiversified. True, the restrictions on 10%+ blocks might really be responses to liquidity, not diversification problems. But these could also be accommodated.
Disclosure of illiquidity problems might be possible. Permission to slow-down redemptions in some circumstances might be possible. Dividends by pro-rata distribution of stock position might be considered.
Conflicts of interest cannot be ignored. But mutual funds present relatively low risks of conflicts since they have little to offer the industrial firm. Mutual funds are not like banks and insurance companies, with loan officers searching for high-interest loans. True, some mutual funds (or, more accurately, their advisors) want access to inside information, others have pension plans to peddle, and others are affiliated with investment banks that could have something to sell. If these seem serious risks, deregulation could begin only with fully independent funds.
If prevention of conflicts of interest were the only goal, then continuation of the fragmentation rules would have some rationale.
But while conflicts of interest should not be ignored, they should not be the only factor weighed in the balance. Recent trends in corporate governance suggest that American companies could profit from more, not less, outside oversight, and mutual funds could be a good place to start. Unlike banks, mutual funds are not highly leveraged. 1 1 9 A decline in value at a large undiversified mutual fund does not have the same risks as a decline in value of a highly leveraged bank. The decline in value at the mutual fund is absorbed by thousands of unlucky individuals; the absorption is smooth, the transaction costs low. The decline in value at a highly leveraged bank is absorbed by bank stockholders and the government insurance fund; the absorption of losses is bumpy, transaction costs are high, the moral hazard of excess risk-taking by insolvent banks is substantial. Failure of a money market mutual fund might have consequences similar to the failure of a bank; these consequences justify stringent safety regulation of money market funds. Such considerations don't spillover to justify prohibiting a "large block" fund whose riskiness has been well disclosed.
Would the current mutual fund industry want to be associated in investors' minds with such "large block" funds? The mutual fund industry itself would be wary of "large block" funds for two reasons, one illegitimate and one legitimate. Since the funds cannot as a matter of law functionally monitor industry, mutual fund managers have no reason to develop the requisite skills. Lacking those skills, fund managers would oppose allowing competition in a dimension in which most are unsuited. This is a standard kind of interest group pressure from incumbents.
While real and probably determinative of the outcome, it is illegitimate.
A closely related consideration is, however, legitimate. Investors who see a risky "large block" fund fail may flee all mutual funds as vehicles for their savings. This flight would be unfortunate. Investor protection would demand heavy disclosure of the risks of concentrated blocks, so that unsophisticated individuals aren't bilked. Any deregulation should categorize "large block" funds as a vehicle quite different than the current mutual funds. That way, the inevitable failure of some "large block" funds will not spillover to the rest of the industry. Distinguishing the two types of funds, making the "large block" funds a separate industry, would require at a minimum that they have a catchy name that is clearly distinct from mutual funds. Unfortunately, I do not have that catchy name yet.
We should keep in mind that within its purposes-diversification and professional management-the current rules work well. Any deregulation should leave the current industry alone, regulated as it is now. A parallel industry of collective investments could arise with a different set of regulations, similar to proposals for banking to allow an ultra-safe, federally-insured narrow bank while a connected, less-regulated, uninsured bank bore risks and undertook activities not now permitted banks.
Of greater weight in the deregulation balance is the risk that it would harm the very matter that interests us: oversight of managers. There's evidence that institutional ownership sometimes enhances managerial power.
1 20 As I've said, financial institutions want to sell their products. Insurance companies and banks want to sell loans, for example. Mutual fund complexes cannot sell loans, but they are not without anything to sell. They would like to manage pension plans. In the recent battle over anti-takeover legislation in Pennsylvania, some mutual funds opposed the legislation. Allegations were heard that one fund dropped its opposition to the anti-takeover bill when managers at a large Pennsylvania corporation switched administration of the company's pension plan to the mutual fund.
12 1
If these risks seem large enough, deregulation could be coupled to a back-scratching prohibition: no 5%+ ownership if the fund, or an affiliated group, sells pension services to the 5%+ company. Furthermore, we may have a bump on a continuum. A sizable, but uninfluential block in the hands of someone with something to sell enhances managerial power. But at some point, the block becomes so large that power shifts to the institution, and it becomes relatively more interested in making money by making the company well-run rather than by selling a few dollars of services to the company.
Moreover, the shareholder of a mutual fund has more power to deal with conflicts of interest of mutual fund managers than she does to deal with conflicts of interest of corporate managers. To sever her ties with conflicted and underperforming corporate managers, the shareholder must overcome severe collective action problems. She must mount a takeover or proxy contest to get rid of the offending managers. True, she can sell her shares to someone else. But that someone else is inextricably bound to the offending managers, unless he can overcome the collective actions problems. Since he will be bound, he will only pay her for the value of the package: a pro-rata interest in the underperforming firm afflicted with these managers. In contrast, the owner of the typical open-end fund may redeem her shares. She can send the shares into the company, and get her money back from the company. The offending managers could quickly find themselves with no assets to manage. Redemption is a serious risk for sub-par mutual fund managers.
Lifting fragmentation rules for nonconflicted mutual funds is the easy advice. The difficult questions arise from the rules that prohibit joint action with other financial institutions. Joint action is where the largest gains and the largest risks lie. Even today, the largest equity mutual fund has no more than $15 billion in assets.
122 (Groups of mutual funds have larger aggregate assets.)
That's a lot on some absolute scale, but not so much that lots of industry monitoring can occur from a mutual fund acting alone. After all, most investors want diversification from mutual funds, even if the funds can provide monitoring services. Because of this investor demand for diversification, only some mutual fund assets will be switched into monitoring. Additional assets may flow into monitoring mutual funds from other savings vehicles, if funds can enhance returns by improving corporate governance. But it is the largest of the public corporations, the Fortune 200 companies, say, or those that cannot readily have a substitute monitor-a rich individual, or the takeover market for example-that are the firms most likely to benefit from enhanced monitoring. But these firms are the most difficult for even the largest mutual funds to monitor, since the funds cannot acquire a large enough block to have influence. A group of financial institutions might be needed. That is, savings can be found in mutual funds, banks, insurance companies, and pension funds. Each savings vehicle has a separate savings function; linking a few multi-billion dollar blocks together could enable financial institutions to enter the boardrooms of the largest industrial companies, as do financial institutions in other nations.
Compensating the mutual fund advisor is a problem. If the advisor monitors or enters the portfolio company's boardroom, it will incur expenses, which it would ordinarily pass onto the mutual fund shareholders. If these expenses are more than trivial, the mutual fund's shareholders have an inducement to withdraw from the fund and invest their money in parallel investments, free-riding on the mutual fund shareholders that remain and bear all of the expenses. It is rational for the mutual fund shareholders to withdraw even if the expenses produce greater gains in the value of the portfolio stock. Withdrawal would allow the stockholder to get the gains without incurring the expense.
But if the mutual fund could take big blocks and act easily with a block owned by an affiliated institution, then the affiliated institution might bear some of the expense (but only to the extent it benefits the institution's directly-owned block). 123 The mutual fund stock would be there just to give the affiliated institution enough voting power to get into the boardroom. But this relationship is exactly the kind that risks serious conflicts of interest; deductively it is unclear whether the gains outweigh the losses.
I can sketch a few of the general problems here. First, we just do not know how substantial the gains would be from institutional entry into the boardroom.
1 2 4 Without a rough estimate, it's hard to know how much risk we should run of conflicts of interest or of concentration of economic power. Second, as I said, the big governance gains are not going to come from unleashing mutual funds alone, but from networking of several institutions. But these linkages create the greatest risks of the very thing that fragmentation was designed to prevent: concentrations of economic power and conflicts of interest. The bank linked with the mutual fund, may take control not for enhancing industrial governance, but to make sure it can place high-priced loans with the portfolio company. Value is thereby transferred from the mutual fund and its shareholders to the bank and its shareholders. Nevertheless, the balance between governance gains and concentration losses probably should be shifted a bit. What we cannot say is how much it should be shifted. Conflicts can be minimized by allowing networking only if the other institutions in the network also forsake selling their products to the portfolio company.
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The focal point for readjusting the balance between conflicts, concentrated power, and governance would be the prohibition on joint activity with nonconflicted affiliates. Possibly, some of these prohibitions could be partially lifted. That is, today the 1940 Act prohibits, absent SEC exemption, a mutual fund owning 5%+ of a portfolio company from acting jointly-to go onto the portfolio company's board, for example-with its investment advisor or any entity that owns 5%+ of the same portfolio company.
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This prohibition could be diluted for affiliates that are insurance companies, other mutual funds, bank trust departments, and pension funds, as long as the other financial entities do not sell their products to the portfolio company.1 26 Such rules would not be perfect. If the downside can be alleviated by reducing the prospect of conflicts of interest, then the question is how much upside there will be. For this I cannot be tremendously optimistic. True, mutual funds (and other institutional investors) seem recently to be more carefully attending to shareholder voting than they once were. This improvement in small-scale monitoring is a reason for optimism. But mutual funds could continue to be oriented to short-run price performance, because that is the way fund managers get ahead, or because fund managers must heed the short-run orientation of the individuals who buy shares of mutual funds. Even if law and politics helped induce the separation of Wall Street from Main Street, reversing law may not easily undo the separation. Corporate culture and history cannot be so easily reversed.
And the potential gains from monitoring cannot be enormous. A mutual fund could be organized that took only influential blocks. It would be taxed at rates of 6.8% and 10.2% on its dividends and 34% on its capital gains, when realized. It would be regulated as a 1940 Act company. 126 Rule 17a-6 exempts some joint efforts, but not the interesting ones. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-6 (1990). Rule 17d-1 restricts most interesting joint efforts. If applicable in Germany, it would prohibit many of the alliances that empower bankers to enter the corporate boardrooms. See id. at § 270.17d-1.
127 When a company has 40% of its assets in investment securities, it becomes a ties regulations that kick in for large blockholders. If we estimate the average tax cost as 10% or 15%, and the "tax" from 1940 Act restrictions as another 5% or 10%, and the "tax" from other securities restrictions as another 5%, then total costs come to 25%, more or less. This cost is not impossible to overcome. Since we don't see such funds, we must believe that such funds could not improve corporate operations by more than 25%. Two alternatives could explain the modest potential gains.
(1) Funds with control simply could do little good in any state of the world. The difference between the American securities-market-centered finance and other nations' financial-institution-centered finance is one of form and not of performance. Or, (2) substitute forms of monitoring-such as that from rich individuals, the takeover market, the capital market, and product market competition-reduce the advantages of outsider monitoring to 25% or less. (1988). If through majority-owned subsidiaries, the company were engagedprimarily in its subsidiaries' business, then it gets an exemption from the 1940 Act. This is essentially saying that if the portfolio companies are subsidiaries, and the investment company is a holding company parent, the 1940 Act doesn't bite. Elements of a "traditional" public choice story-of interest groups buying favorable legislation-are present. But surprisingly the interest group story does not drive the legislation. The ideology of fragmentation seems paramount. Key actors-FDR, Douglas, Brandeis, and Wilson-thought that Wall Street control of industry was bad. The interest group story, if there is one, comes from the appeals some of them made, favoring managers over bankers, and from the persistent survival of the fragmenting legislation. Congress simultaneously passed the fragmenting tax legislation and an undistributed profits tax, which threatened managerial independence. The threatening tax -was unstable, challenged, and eventually repealed.
Rather than an interest group story, we should think of the politics of mutual funds in the 1930s as creating mutual funds. Without tax exemption, the funds could not survive. Politicians allowed tax exemption consistent with their conception of what a mutual fund should be and should not be. It should not control industry; it should not have concentrated investments; it should not be entangled in financial alliances that could create conflicts of interest. Politicians created a framework for mutual funds to grow, a framework that made it difficult or impossible for mutual funds to actively affect portfolio companies.
Undoubtedly investors want many things: diversification, low risk, high return, instant liquidity, easy evaluation of the investment, no risk of conflict of interests in any intermediary, and perfectlymanaged industrial companies. Obviously, some goals must be traded off against others. The 1940 Act and subchapter M make it easy to diversify and get high liquidity. They minimize the conflicts of interest between the fund advisor and fund owners. But they don't easily allow investors to buy an intermediary that takes big stock positions and forms coalitions with other financial institutions to sit on the boards of portfolio companies. These laws reduce the agency costs in the intermediary, but are unhelpful in reducing the agency costs in the portfolio company, or in integrating industry with capital, by facilitating the flow of soft and proprietary information from the industrial company to capital intermediaries that take large stock positions and sit on the boards of portfolio companies. Perhaps that is the right trade-off to make. But it isn't obvious that it is the only plausible way to trade-off goals; it is not the trade-off made in other countries.
The fragmented ownership structure of the large public corporation is often thought to be a natural economic evolution.
